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INTRODUCTION
Investment bankers, attorneys, and corporate officers are going to
jail in recent years in increasing numbers for violating securities in-
sider trading laws.' This has occasioned an outpouring of literature
on the policies underlying the law enforcement campaign.2
Much of the debate has focused on the mechanics and scope of
insider trading, its characterization as a social evil, and whether it
actually constitutes a problem in the first place.3 Controversy also
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1. See, e.g., Levine Sentence Seen in Line with Insider-Trading Penalties,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 3; Southern District Insider-Trading Defendants
Prosecuted Since 1980, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1987, at 17; Trading Places, TIME, Dec. 28,
1987, at 63 (Boesky sentencing).
2. See, e.g., Lowenfels & Bromberg, Insider Trading-Arguments In Favor of It
and Against, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 3; The SEC v. Wall Street?, Wall St. J.,
May 28, 1986, at 34, col. 1; Boesky the Terrible, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1986, at 32, col.
1; COMM. ON CRIMINAL LAW OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INSIDER TRADING OF SECURITIES 32 (1986) [herein-
after N.Y.C. BAR REPORT]; Stigler, Inside Traders and Traitors, Chicago Tribune, July
7, 1986, § 1, at 9; DePetris & Summit, The Insider-Trading Panic, Overlooked Ele-
ments of Scienter, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Wallance, Insider Trading -
Objective Enforcement Standards Needed, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 3; Kohn,
Bar Council Panelists Split on SEC Record with Insiders, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 1,
col. 3; Leisure & Wilkinson, Private Rights of Action Based on Insider Trading,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 3; Macey, Too Strict a Crackdown Will Harm Mar-
kets, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 34, col. 4.
3. The articles and works on insider trading are too numerous to cite in toto.
The seminal work on the subject is Dean Henry G. Manne's brilliant book, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET, which argued that insider trading is a most effective
method to compensate entrepreneurs. Manne also argued that "investors" who do not
trade frequently seldom are harmed by inside information. He further argued that in-
sider trading moved stock prices in the correct direction, and thus, improved the effi-
ciency of stock markets. See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
surrounds the proper definition of insider trading.4 Finally, disagree-
ment exists over the applicability of the federal securities anti-fraud
statutes to insider trading.5 This Article will advance the concept
that insider trading law under Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rule lOb-5 is in reality a form of protection of property rights
in information. The Article develops the relationships between trade
secrets law and rule 1Ob-5 doctrine, and indeed concludes that the
securities law of insider trading may be viewed as a form of trade
secrets law.
The Rationale Behind The Rules
There are two basic types of insider trading cases. Each has a sep-
arate and distinct fact pattern. In Case I, a corporate officer or di-
rector trades in the stock of his corporation without advance disclo-
sure of a material nonpublic piece of information about the
corporation, developed or learned in the course of his employment.'
MARKET (1966); see also Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L.
REv. 547 (1970).
For more recent literature, see, e.g., Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trad-
ing, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 863 (1987); Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical
Response to the "Chicago School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628; Dooley, Enforcement of Insider
Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Infor-
mational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979);
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production
of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309 [hereinafter Easterbrook, Insider Trading]; Eas-
terbrook, Insider Trading As An Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985); Haft, The Effect of
Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L.
REv. 1051 (1982); Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980); Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the
Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982); Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The
New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984);
Macey & Haddock, Regulation on Demand: The Influence of Special Interest Groups
on SEC Enforcement of Insider Trading Rules, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987); Scott,
Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801
(1980); Wang, Trading on Material Non-Public Information on Impersonal Stock Mar-
kets: Who is Harmed and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule l0b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1217 (1981).
Economists have studied the subject. See, e.g., Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and
Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J.L. & ECON. 35 (1968); Jaffe, Special
Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974); Givoly & Palmon, Insider
Trading and the Exploitation of Insider Information: Some Empirical Evidence, 58 J.
Bus. 69 (1985); Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading and Market Efficiency, 16 J.
FIN. ECON. 189 (1986).
4. See, e.g., sources cited in note 3, supra; see also Fed. L. Rep. (CCH) 11261,
Nov. 25, 1987, at 122 (describing SEC's letter to Senate Subcommittee on Securities,
Nov. 19, 1987, proposing definition of insider trading); see also infra note 21.
5. See infra note 116.
6. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
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This usually triggers an application of rule lOb-5. If a tender offer
is involved, it may also constitute a violation of rule 14e-3.1 As this
paper subsequently discusses, there is a considerable body of schol-
arly debate as to whether shareholders or insiders can most effi-
ciently use or dispose of that information. 9 A typical fact pattern
might involve a situation in which officers and geologists of a mineral
corporation, through research and scientific work, learn that valuable
mineral ore exists in certain Canadian real estate.10 The corporation
plans to acquire real estate through purchase from the present own-
ers. The corporation, needless to say, does not disclose its informa-
tion to the prospective sellers. Corporate officers and directors in pos-
session of this material inside information purchase shares of
common stock on the New York Stock Exchange without advance
disclosure of the information. They sell at a profit after the news of
the discovery is made public. In construing rule 1Ob-5, the courts
have held that since the insiders have a fiduciary relationship to their
corporation's shareholders they owe an affirmative duty to disclose
the inside information a reasonable time before trading.11 However,
if a stranger to the corporation, through her own research (and not
through tips from the insiders), learned of the geological news, she
would be free to trade without disclosure since she lacked any fiduci-
ary relationship to the sellers on the other side of her purchases. As
we shall see later, the reference to fiduciary relationship needs expli-
cation since the term has acquired a meaning which describes the
obligations that arise because of certain underlying policy concerns
with property interests in information.1 2 Where the facts involve a
tender offer, rule 14e-3 will be triggered, which does not require a
breach of fiduciary relationship to sustain a civil or criminal action
for the trading.' 3
7. See generally id.
8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1987); see infra note 13.
9. See supra note 3; see infra notes 90-91. See also Report of the Task Force on
Regulation of Insider Trading, 41 Bus. LAw 223, 227 & n.6 (1985); Carney, Why In-
sider Trading Should Be Legal, INV. DEALERS' DIG., June 2, 1986, at 44; The SEC v.
Wall Street?, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 34, col. 1.
10. The fact pattern generally parallels that of the Texas Gulf Sulphur case. See
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833.
11. See, e.g., Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
12. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 317-23.
13. See N.Y.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (Dec. 1986).
[R]ule 14e-3 promulgated by the SEC under the power granted to it by section
14(e) of the Exchange Act to prevent fraud in connection with tender offers,
retains the possession theory by prohibiting trading by those possessing non-
In Case II, a noncorporate insider filches material nonpublic infor-
mation affecting the stock of the corporation, sometimes from his
employer, and trades on it.1 Rule lOb-5 or rule 14e-3 may also ap-
ply to these facts. A typical example might involve a printer's em-
ployee who learns that X corporation eventually may bid for the
stock of Y corporation. In violation of the printer's policy, the em-
ployee buys stocks of Y and sells at a profit when the bid is formally
announced. Since she has no fiduciary duty to the shareholders of Y
corporation, she has no rule 10b-5 duty to disclose the information.
However, courts have held that since the employee owes a duty to
her employer or its client not to trade on information that she ac-
quires in the course of her employment, she has misappropriated in-
formation in connection with a purchase or sale of stock; hence she
has criminally violated rule lOb-5.15 If rule 14e-3 applies to the
transaction, however, no fiduciary relationship to anyone is re-
quired."6 Thus, if both the printer and client, for their own reasons,
consent to the employee's trading, the analysis for a rule 1Ob-5 viola-
tion ends, but not the analysis for a rule 14e-3 violation.
United States v. Chiarella1 7 represents a famous example of Case
II. In Chiarella, the printer's employee decoded material about fu-
ture takeovers and mergers planned by bidders who were customers
of the printer's employer. The bidders delivered the bidding materi-
als to the printer in coded form to preserve the confidentiality of the
targets' identities prior to public filing with the SEC. The employee
traded on that information. The Supreme Court overturned his crim-
inal conviction, reasoning that because he had no relationship to the
target companies he had no fiduciary relationship to its sharehold-
ers.18 Therefore, he had no affirmative obligation to disclose the
names of the target corporations before he traded in their stock.
However, the Court reserved decision on future cases that specifi-
public information of impending tender offers. Section 14(e), however, like §
10(b), is directed at fraud rather than unfairness. This raises doubts about the
SEC power under § 14(e) to make a rule that reaches beyond the fiduciary
duty theory of Chiarella.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd,
108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); see infra note 21.
15. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). In private civil
actions for damages, the standing requirement prevents suits by plaintiff purchasers or
sellers of stock since they cannot show that the defendants have a fiduciary duty to them.
That standing requirement is not essential in criminal or SEC enforcement cases. See
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub. nom. Moss v.
Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
16. See Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, 1980 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980).
17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. Id. at 224-25, 235-37.
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cally charged to a jury that someone in the employee's position had
wrongfully misappropriated information belonging to his employer or
his employer's customers in connection with stock trading.19 A num-
ber of courts of appeals have approved the misappropriation doc-
trine.20 Most recently, the Supreme Court split 4-4 on the question
of the viability of the misappropriation doctrine in the case of Car-
penter v. United States.21
19. Id. at 236-37.
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1053 (1985);
21. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). In this decision, Petitioner R. Foster Winans, a Wall
Street Journal employee, coauthored the highly regarded Journal column, "Heard on the
Street." Because of its reputation, the column had an impact on the prices of securities it
discussed. Winans entered into a scheme with stockbrokers who, in exchange for leaks on
the contents and timing of the column, would trade in the stocks and share profits with
him. The articles did not contain confidential inside information about the corporations
discussed therein. The newspaper had a policy, known to Winans, forbidding such use or
disuse of the contents and timing of the articles. Winans and petitioner Kenneth Felis
were convicted of violating section 10(b) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 and rule
l0b-5 thereunder, as well as the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. The convictions of
these two and certain others were affirmed, with some minor exceptions, by the Second
Circuit. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 666 (1987).
The lower courts found that Winans had "knowingly breached a duty of confidentiality
by misappropriating prepublication information regarding the timing and contents of the
'Heard' columns .... " 108 S. Ct. at 319. The Supreme Court pointed out that "[ilt
was this appropriation of confidential information that underlay both the securities laws
and mail and wire fraud counts." Id.
The Court split 4-4 on the securities laws convictions. Hence, it affirmed the judgment
below on those counts. The Court unanimously upheld the mail and wire fraud convic-
tions. Id. at 320.
The split vote leaves the final resolution of the misappropriation doctrine in securities
laws undecided, awaiting either judicial or legislative resolution. The unanimous vote in
favor of the mail and wire fraud convictions was based upon a property analysis, which is
similar to the analysis of rule 1Ob-5 doctrine set forth in this Article.
The Court held that in the wire and mail fraud counts, Winans had fraudulently mis-
appropriated property within the intent of the statutes. Id. at 322. Petitioners, citing
McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), had argued that "the Journal's inter-
est in prepublication confidentiality for the 'Heard' columns is no more than an intangi-
ble consideration outside the reach of section 1341 .... ." 108 S. Ct. at 320. The Su-
preme Court disagreed, ruling that "[clonfidential business information has long been
recognized as property." Id.
The Court also discussed the need to prove harm, a matter considered in this Article.
The Court ruled that "[p]etitioners cannot successfully contend based on [International
News Service v. Associated Press, 284 U.S. 215 (1918)] that a scheme to defraud re-
quires a monetary loss, such as giving the information to a competitor; it is sufficient that
the Journal has been deprived of its right to exclusive use of the information, for exclu-
sivity is an important aspect of confidential business information and most private prop-
erty for that matter." 108 S. Ct. 321.
This last point indicates that the illustrations discussed in the text (see infra notes 83-
89 and accompanying text) on insider stock trading on trade secrets without corporate
Inside Information As Property
In both types of securities fraud cases, imposition of civil or crimi-
nal penalties turns on the use or misuse of confidential information.
We can gain a greater understanding of the true nature of securities
law in this area if we analyze property concepts in information, par-
ticularly those bearing on trade secrets law. This analysis will reveal
that insider trading law can properly be regarded, to a considerable
degree, as an effort to protect corporate property rights in informa-
tion.22 To the extent that is true, the corporation owner of the prop-
erty right in information (as the owner of any other property right)
should be free to decide through usual corporate modes of decision-
making whether to keep the property or transfer it to insiders or
others.
In the Case II securities transaction, avoiding harm to public trad-
ing shareholders is not the rationale for the securities law prohibi-
tion, insofar as rule 10b-5 is concerned, since consent by the em-
consent may involve criminal violation of mail and wire fraud statutes despite lack of
proof of monetary harm. Further, the Court's discussion, certainly by strong implication
at least, indicates that no monetary harm need be proven for trade secret law violation.
It is also significant that the Court appeared to approve of the controversial duty of
loyalty case, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y. 2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910
(1969), which upheld an insider trading derivative suit on state duty of loyalty grounds
in the absence of proof of monetary harm to the corporate issuer (see infra note 89 and
accompanying text). The Supreme Court stated, citing Diamond, "As the New York
courts have recognized, 'It is well established, as a general proposition, that a person who
acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge or information for his own
personal benefit but must account to his principal for any profits derived therefrom.'"
108 S. Ct. at 321.
The failure to resolve the rule lOb-5 misappropriation theory, because of the split vote,
will be most significant in civil cases. Individual plaintiffs and the SEC will not have the
benefit of a high court resolution. If the U.S. government wishes to prosecute criminally,
it now can use the mail and wire fraud statutes for virtually every case of securities
fraud.
Finally, it is of note that on November 19, 1987, the SEC transmitted legislation to
define and prohibit insider trading. As reported in the Corporate Counsel Weekly, the
SEC would include the phrases "misappropriation" and "conversion" in the bill's defini-
tion of insider trading violations. Corp. Counsel Weekly (BNA), No. 46, at 2 (Nov. 25,
1987). As reported in the November 25, 1987 CCH Federal Securities Law Reports, the
"... proposal would prohibit persons from trading or causing trading of, any security
while in possession of material nonpublic information when they know or recklessly disre-
gard that the information has been 'obtained wrongfully' or that the trade would consti-
tute a 'wrongful use' of the information. This would occur if the information has been
obtained by or its use would constitute (A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation or espionage
or (B) conversion, misappropriation, breach of any other fiduciary duty or breach of
other relationships." Fed. Sec. Rep. (CCH) 11261 pt. 1, at 1 & 2 (Nov. 25, 1987). The
SEC proposal also includes express private rights of action for "contemporaneous traders
and for other persons who are injured by violations . . . ." Id. at 2.
22. Three exceptionally good earlier analyses of the implications of corporate
property interests in insider information are Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3; Easter-
brook, Insider Trading, supra note 3; Macey, supra note 3.
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ployer will vitiate a securities law action. The rule 1Ob-5 violation
turns on the defendant employee's (or agent's) misappropriation of
confidential information belonging to the employer (or principal).
Clearly, the employer's property right in the information is being
protected, not the interest of trading shareholders. However, rule
14e-3 prohibits trading on inside information by the employee tippee,
or any other tippee, bearing on tender offers, even where the em-
ployer (or principal) voluntarily gives the information to the defend-
ant tippee. In formulating this rule, the SEC departs from a "prop-
erty theft" theory and instead relies exclusively on a "harm to public
traders" theory.
In the Case I transaction, the rationale usually given in applying
rule lOb-5 is to protect individual trading shareholders from harm
by their fiduciary. The stated theory of the case insofar as rule 1Ob-5
is concerned turns on the existence of a fiduciary relationship of in-
sider to shareholders and a violation of that relationship by an act of
trading without disclosure of the inside information.24 However, the
fiduciary relationship lends itself to a property explanation. The law
does not require the insider, in the absence of inside information, to
first share his superior investment skill, if he has it, with sharehold-
ers before trading with them. The violation of the fiduciary relation-
ship results from the insider using property information belonging to
the corporation, his employer, for his own benefit.
Therefore, where the information is initially property of the corpo-
23. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text; see also N.Y.C. BAR REPORT,
supra note 2, at 13 ("although it can be argued that the federal securities laws should
only protect purchasers or sellers of securities, the SEC and federal prosecutors have
pursued novel theories of fiduciary duty and misappropriation that focus on other par-
ties.") (footnote omitted).
24. The SEC promulgated rule lOb-5 in 1942 under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
The rule was utilized against insiders very quickly. See In re The Purchase and Retire-
ment of Ward La France Truck Corp. Class A and Class B Stocks, 13 S.E.C. 373
(1943). However, until 1961 its application apparently was restricted to failures to dis-
close in face-to-face transactions between insiders and stockholders. See Wilkinson, The
Affirmative Duty to Disclose After Chiarella and Dirks, 10 J. CORP. L. 581, 583-85
(1985). In the famous SEC case In re Cady, Roberts Co., the SEC decided in 1961 that
rule lob-5 applied to nondisclosure of material inside information in impersonal transac-
tions in the open market. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the court stated
that the doctrine "is based on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to mate-
rial information." 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub. nom.
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Chiarella, the Supreme Court made it clear that
the duty to disclose was not based upon the mere possession of inside information. The
Court held that there must be a relationship of trust between the parties before a duty to
disclose can emerge. See 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980).
ration, if the corporation has granted or transferred its property
right in the information to insiders, it appears difficult for trading
shareholders to argue that they have suffered legally cognizable
harm because through board or shareholder vote, they have trans-
ferred their rights in the information. The wisdom of the corporate
decision in that regard will turn on the efficiency of insider trading
as a form of compensation to insiders versus the danger that insider
trading will prematurely signal the existence of the confidential in-
formation to competitors.25
Again, rule 14e-3, unlike rule 10b-5, may impose penalties in cer-
tain cases involving tender offer information even where the issuer
permits the insider or tippee to use the information. That rule obvi-
ously is not based upon a notion of property rights in information
and the illegality of theft of information.26
TRADE SECRETS LAW
An understanding of trade secrets law provides an important key
to the understanding of insider trading law. It will support the prin-
cipal arguments of this Article that (1) rule lOb-5 insider trading
law, to a considerable extent, is a subset of trade secrets law; and (2)
when inside information is initially property of the corporation, the
corporation's management, pursuant to accepted notions of the busi-
ness judgment rule, 7 should be free to retain or transfer the right to
use inside information, as it can any trade secret. Further, an appli-
cation of trade secrets law to insider trading cases indicates that in
certain situations the insider, not the corporate employer, is the
rightful initial owner of the information.
In the United States two bodies of law protect business ownership
of confidential information from an unauthorized taking. One is pat-
ent law.2 It requires disclosure of the information in return for pro-
tection of a limited duration.29 The other is trade secrets law. 0
25. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 140-155 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 35.
30. Firms whose success depends upon the use of secret information run the risk
that theft of such data will cause enormous losses. The risks of such loss have been
magnified in recent years by the rise of sophisticated industrial espionage and employee
mobility. Advanced methods of electronic spying increase the risks of theft. Contributing
to the danger is the greater frequency with which key executives switch jobs and take
confidential information with them to the new employer.
One authority recently has stated:
The first half of the 1980's has witnessed a veritable explosion of the misappro-
priation of trade secrets. Such misappropriation costs American businesses, it
has been said, up to 20 billion dollars annually. Even more harmful is that it
contravenes the public's interest in encouraging research and innovation by re-
ducing incentives to develop new technology . . . . Consequently, it is of para-
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Trade secrets law protects information even where it is not novel
enough to enjoy patent protection 31 The protection lasts for an in-
definite duration provided the information remains secret.32
Trade secrets law operates to protect information that is corporate
property. Sometimes the information may also be protectable by pat-
ent law. However, the corporation may choose the trade secret route
since the legal protection continues indefinitely so long as the infor-
mation is kept secret. Patent law requires publication of the informa-
tion and has a limited duration.33
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws stated in connection with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act:
3 4
A valid patent provides a legal monopoly for seventeen years in exchange
for public disclosure of an invention. If, however, the courts ultimately de-
cide that the Patent Office improperly issued a patent, an invention will
have been disclosed to competitors with no corresponding benefit. In view of
the substantial number of patents that are invalidated by the courts, many
businesses now elect to protect commercially valuable information through
reliance upon the state law of trade secret protection. Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), which establishes that neither the Pat-
ent Clause of the United States Constitution nor the federal patent laws
preempt state trade secret protection for patentable or unpatentable infor-
mation may well have increased the extent of this reliance.31
Trade secrets are information that derive economic value from se-
crecy. An extremely wide variety of knowledge or information is pro-
tectable as a trade secret. The definition includes knowledge of tech-
nological processes, as well as nontechnological business information
such as pricing, cost codes, and marketing techniques. 36 Under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, episodic single event information, nega-
tive information, and information of potential value are included.
3 7
mount importance for firms . . . to know what rights they have under the
law....
Hutter, Legal Theories and Recent Developments, in 1986 PROTECTING TRADE SECRErS
13 (Practising Law Institute) (footnotes omitted).
31. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
32. See HOFER, TRADE SECRETS: PROTECTION AND REMEDIES, A-3 (Bureau of
Nat'l Affairs 1985).
33. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
34. Subsequent to adoption by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Com-
missioners) in 1979, versions of the act have been adopted in 19 states. Silberberg &
Lardiere, Eroding Protection of Customer Lists Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
42 Bus. LAW. 487, 488 (1987).
35. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Comm'rs' Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980).
36. See Hutter, Trade Secret Law: Theories and Context, in 1985 PROTECTING
TRADE SECRETS 12 (Practising Law Institute).
37. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the Act) defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process that:
Trade secrets cannot be misappropriated38 by employees or others
without the imposition of civil or criminal penalties.3 9 Since trade
secrets are considered property,40 they are protected by the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution from unlawful taking
by the government.4' Moreover, a trade secret owner has the power
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being gen-
erally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 541, 542 (1985).
At common law, the most often used definition of trade secret was set forth in the
1939 Restatement of Torts. It read in part: "A trade secret may consist of any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or
use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b, at 5 (1939).
The Commissioners pointed out that the definition of trade secret in the Act
contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) defini-
tion which required that a trade secret be "continuously used in one's busi-
ness." The broader definition in the proposed Act extends protection to a plain-
tiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade
secret to use. The definition includes information that has commercial value
from a negative viewpoint, for example the results of lengthy and expensive
research which proves that a certain process will not work could be of great
value to a competitor.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Comm'rs' comment, 14 U.L.A. at 543 (1980).
38. The Commissioners point out that "[flor liability to exist under this Act, a
section 1(4) trade secret must exist and either a person's acquisition of the trade secret,
disclosure of the trade secret to others, or use of the trade secret must be improper under
section 1(2)." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Comm'rs' prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. at 538
(1985). Wrongful taking is defined in this note as misappropriation. Id.
"Misappropriation" means:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason
to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to ac-
quire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy
or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking
relief to maintain its secrecy or limits its use; or
(C) before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know that
it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or
mistake.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 537, 541-42.
39. See infra notes 47-50.
40. In one of the standard treatises on trade secrets, the author states that
"[r]ecognition of trade secrets as property is a basic conceptual step from which impor-
tant aspects of trade secret law are derived. I R. MILGRIM, MILIGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS, .§ 1.01, at 1-2 (1987). The author argues that this view "characterizes as 'prop-
erty' the bundle of rights of the owner of a trade secret." Id. The author concludes, "The
right to prevent unauthorized use or disclosure" is one of those rights." Id.
41. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-1004 (1984) (a state-
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and the right to sell his secret.4" Trade secrets include material that
is not protected by patent, although trade secret protection fre-
quently may extend to arrangements of information that is also pro-
tectable by patent law.43
Insider trading law turns in part on the concept of material secret
information." Any confidential information that may reasonably
have an impact upon the price of the stock if known or disclosed will
be considered material.4 5 Trade secrets probably denominate a cate-
gory of information that is of narrower scope than securities law no-
tions of material information. But clearly an enormous overlap of the
two categories exists.
Trade secrets law is a subset of intellectual property law. In exis-
tence are well established doctrines of patent and trademark that
protect new forms of information. The reason for the development of
trade secrets law appears to be that its flexible definition of protected
information and indefinite period of protection have proved best
suited to meet the demands of business in a time of rapidly changing
technology. The burgeoning computer programs and semiconductor
industries are prime examples of businesses that require trade secret
protection.46 Trade secrets law provides the necessary inducement to
business to research, innovate, and develop new ideas. The business
or individual owner may lease or grant the property right to others
as it pleases.
Under certain circumstances an employee who takes his em-
ployer's trade secret commits a crime as well as a civil wrong under
accepted property right in a trade secret would be protected by the fifth amendment
takings clause).
42. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
43. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
45. The duty to disclose under rule 10b-5 arises only if the information is mate-
rial. See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848-50; List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). The test of materiality is
broad. In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, the Supreme Court asserted:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
[investor] would consider it important in [making his or her investment deci-
sions] . . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable inves-
tor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made
available.
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
46. See supra note 30. A number of Supreme Court decisions have restricted the
use of patents to computer programs. Compare Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972) (no patent protection) and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (no patent pro-
tection) with Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (giving patent protection).
state law.4 7 The question in each state will be whether the general
statutes on larceny, embezzlement, and robbery cover trade secret
misappropriation. That question raises the issue of whether the term
"property" in the general criminal statute encompasses trade
secrets.48 Alternatively, there may be a specific trade secret crime
statute in the jurisdiction.49 Certain federal statutes make theft of
trade secrets a crime.50
Commercial Bribery Statutes
Commercial bribery statutes also play a role in protecting corpo-
rate rights to information. For example, in Perrin v. United States, 1
petitioner (among others) was convicted of violating and conspiring
to violate the Travel Act,52 which makes it a federal offense to travel
or use a facility in interstate commerce to commit, inter alia, "brib-
ery . . . in violation of the laws of the state in which committed. 53
In that case Perrin and others attempted to steal key mineral explo-
ration facts from a Louisiana-located company. They approached
Roger Willis, an employee of the company, and asked him to filch
the information in return for a percentage of the profits from a cor-
poration which was formed to use the stolen data.54
Willis tipped off the FBI. The Supreme Court ultimately held in
the case that the term "bribery" in the federal Act included pay-
ments to private individuals to influence their actions.35 The Louisi-
ana statute provided in part that "commercial bribery is the giving
• . . of. . . value to any private agent, employee, or fiduciary, with-
out the knowledge and consent of the principal or employer, with the
intent to influence such agent's, employee's, or fiduciary's action in
relation to the principal's or employer's affairs."56
The similarity of the principles that the Court upheld in the Per-
rin case to principles which insider misappropriation of information
rules are aimed to protect is apparent. Likewise the trade secret defi-
nition of misappropriation (including its reference to tipping con-
cepts)57 resembles misappropriation doctrine in securities law. The
difference, in part, lies in the fact that insider trading, where the
47. 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 40, § 1.10, at 1-62.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 1.10[2], at 1-81. A comprehensive list of federal and state trade secret
theft statutes is contained in Epstein, Criminal Liability for the Misappropriation of
Trade Secrets, reprinted in 3 R. MILGRIM, supra note 40, app. B-5.
51. 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
53. Id.
54. Perrin, 444 U.S. at 40.
55. See id. at 41-49.
56. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.73 (West 1974).
57. See supra note 38.
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corporation does not consent to it, involves the misappropriation of
information via one specific means, that of stock trading.
I
Coase's Theory
Coase's brilliant insight is very relevant at this point: Whether
trade secrets or securities law denominated material information is
more valuable to the firm and shareholders or more valuable to the
management will determine (when transaction costs of negotiation
are low) with whom the property right will ultimately rest.58 Thus,
in the absence of legal restraint, shareholders will transfer rights in
inside information or trade secrets to managers if they are the higher
valuing users. Particularly, if a corporation and its insiders mutually
will gain by permitting insiders to trade on inside information, the
corporation will transfer its ownership interest in the information to
the insiders.
Trade secrets law permits corporate employers to transfer rights in
secrets to others pursuant to mutually agreed upon contracts. Fur-
ther, it is hardly clear whether and when the employer corporation
or the employee (in the absence of explicit contracts) initially owns
the trade secret.5 9 The courts apply various tests that are frequently
difficult to apply in a given setting.6" Hence, trade secrets attorneys
counsel their corporate clients to prepare and bargain for detailed
contracts from key employees that clarify the employer's ownership
rights in confidential information."
In attempting to discover an implicit contract between employer
and employee in the absence of explicit agreement, courts appear to
balance the interest of the employer in developing innovative tech-
nology against the interest of employees in developing merchantable
skills that can be marketed at some time in their careers with other
employers.6 2 Courts appear to discriminate between information dis-
closed to or learned by an employee in the course of her employment
and information developed in whole or in part by the employee
which is not connected with her specific job.6 In the latter category,
the employee, in certain circumstances, will be given initial property
rights in the information. For example, where the employer has not
58. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
59. See generally I R. MILGRIM, supra note 40, § 5.02.
60. Id. at 5-15 to 5-63.
61. Id. at 5-61.
62. Id. at 5-15 to 5-46.
63. Id. at 5-18, 5-46 to 5-63.
hired her to invent a specific device, yet the employee develops a
valuable technique, the employee is more likely to prevail in litiga-
tion about the ownership of the trade secret.0 4 With respect to the
second category, one leading treatise goes so far as to assert that:
inventions made by an employee, although made during the hours of em-
ployment and with the use of his employer's materials, facilities and person-
nel, are the employee's property unless by the terms of his employment, or
otherwise, he agreed to transfer the ownership (as distinguished from the
use) of such inventions."b
Even in the case of the first category above, courts may sometimes
give an ex-employee property rights in information in order to facili-
tate her job mobility.60
Since there is some uncertainty in traditional trade secret law
about who has initial ownership, the same legal question may arise
in any insider trading case involving trade secrets, and perhaps in
any insider trading case involving confidential information.
Inside Trading as Compensation
It has been argued that insiders should be granted rights by corpo-
rate employers to trade, as a more efficient form of compensation in
lieu of traditional salary or bonus arrangements. 67 This approach ar-
guably motivates insiders to create productive trade secrets that will
benefit the corporation as well as the insiders. It may be asserted,
however, that corporations (assuming the applicable legal doctrine
places initial ownership of trade secrets or confidential information
with the corporation) must be prevented by law from voluntarily
transferring trade secrets to insiders as a form of compensation. 8
The argument is that the temptation of management to overreach is
too great. In addition, the rewards of insider trading are difficult to
measure, and corporations, lacking subpoena power, cannot ade-
quately examine insider trading records. Thus, the corporations, it is
asserted, seemingly lack ability to regulate, control, or assess the sig-
nificance of such a compensation scheme.
However, the argument ignores that in certain cases corporate
boards may reasonably decide that it is more efficient to award insid-
ers compensation via insider trading rather than by salary or stock
options. There is a vast amount of literature on the pros and cons of
these arguments.6 9 When the decisions are made by independent
boards, the liberal business judgment rule applies and the directors
64. Id. § 5.02(4)(b), at 5-50.1 to 5-50.2.
65. Id. at 5-52 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. § 5.02(3).
67. See supra note 3 and infra note 90.
68. See Cox, supra note 3, at 653-55.
69. See supra note 3 and infra note 90.
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are not liable for their mistakes provided they make reasonably in-
formed decisions based on an adequate investigation of the facts.70
A flat ban would prevent boards from entering into transactions
that they believe are more valuable to the corporation than tradi-
tional compensation. Thus, the ban would prevent mutually agreed
upon transactions that are value increasing (that is, the corporation
and the employee each value the result more than a traditional sal-
ary arrangement).
Some have argued that the corporate employer cannot know the
costs and benefits of a contract awarding inside information to man-
agers.7' Hence, corporations should be banned from voluntarily en-
tering into such a transaction. The argument is based in part upon
the assumption that shareholders will not be able to quantify the
benefits, if any, such as a more effective management, presumably
resulting from permitting insiders to trade on inside information.
This argument demands a higher degree of performance accuracy
from managers compensated through inside trading than from more
traditional modes of compensation. It is very difficult to quantify
with any accuracy the exact relationship between management effi-
ciency and a particular mode of salary or bonus arrangement; how-
ever, cash salary or bonus arrangements, as opposed to inside trad-
ing, do not make the computation of managerial efficiency any
easier. Directors must be free to exercise their judgment and in-
stinct, informed by records of corporate performance. In the last
analysis the market will discipline the choice; share prices will be at
a higher level if a more efficient compensation package is utilized. 2
Furthermore, the argument that the costs of insider trading compen-
sation cannot be limited or scrutinized by the corporate employer is
incorrect. Firms need not enforce contracts on insider trading as
compensation with exact precision in order to benefit from permit-
ting insiders to trade. To regulate the process, firms can require an
audit of Schedule D of the manager's tax return and can impose
sanctions such as liquidated damages and termination of employ-
70. See R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 633-99 (3d ed.
1986).
71. See Cox, supra note 3, at 649-53.
72. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis establishes, inter alia, that all pub-
licly available information about issuers is quickly reflected in stock prices. See, e.g.,
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.
383 (1970); Comment, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and
The Regulation of The Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977).
ment73 to penalize a manager that violates the terms of the compen-
sation agreement.
TRADE SECRETS LAW AND INSIDER TRADING
This section of the Article will examine the similarities and dis-
similarities between insider trading doctrine and trade secrets law. It
also will consider the applications of corporate law.
Insider trading law protects a shareholder or corporate interest in
information that is "material. ' 74 Securities law defines "materiality"
as protected information, just as the Uniform Trade Secrets Act de-
fines information that is protected under the Act.7 5 Accordingly,
there must be many occasions when the definition of "material"
overlaps with the traditional definitions of a trade secret.
Consider the case of a corporate officer or director who trades on
material inside information like the scenario in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case mentioned earlier.70 The corporation lawfully discov-
ered the probable presence of valuable minerals in certain Canadian
real estate and secretly bid for the mineral right to the property.7"
That is, it bid without revealing its discoveries to the prospective sell-
ers of the land. Meanwhile, certain insiders or their tippees bought
stock and calls without disclosing the geological finds to the traders
on the other side of the market. The geological information was
clearly a trade secret.78 The stock trading was held a violation of
SEC rule lOb-5. 9 Professor Kronman notes that with reference to
the real estate transaction,
in a litigated case arising out of a related transaction the Ontario High
Court of Justice remarked that Texas Gulf Sulphur was only doing what
any prudent mining company would have done to acquire property in which
it knew a very promising anomaly lay when it purchased property "without
causing the prospective vendors to suspect that a discovery had been
made."'80 .
73. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 864. Also, federal statutes could re-
quire reports on insider trading with civil and criminal penalties; these reports could be
used by management to police and tailor insider trading for management compensation
purposes.
74. See supra note 45.
75. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
77. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843-47; see also supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text.
78. See I R. MILIGRIM, supra note 40, § 6.02(2), at 6-26 (1986).
79. See supra note 24.
80. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 20 (1978) (quoting from Leitch Gold Mines, Ltd. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 1 O.R. 469, 492-93 (1969)). Professor Kronman points out, "In order to en-
courage the production of such information [mineral research], our legal system gener-
ally permits its possessor to take advantage of the ignorance of others by trading without
disclosure." Kronman, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. at 21.
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If the corporate insiders had used their knowledge of the trade
secrets personally to buy up real estate, hence making corporate real
estate purchases in the area more expensive, this clearly would have
been a violation of trade secrets law.8' It probably would have served
also as a violation of traditional corporate opportunity doctrine.82
Now consider insider stock trading from the standpoint of the corpo-
ration where the corporation did not consent to it in advance. Did
the insiders' use of trade secret information in the course of trading
constitute a violation of trade secrets law? The argument might turn,
in part, on the existence of harm to the corporation.83 For example,
there is the possibility the insider trading signaled the existence of
the trade secret to outside competitors. By price movement and trad-
ers' talk, the trading may have leaked the inside news to the compe-
tition. Professor William Carney, in a recent article, demonstrates
that this is a very unlikely scenario; nonetheless, it remains a possi-
bility in a given case.84 A plaintiff corporation that can prove that
inside trading caused it harm by signaling the existence of the trade
secret to competitors8" has a prima facie trade secret case, as well as
a shareholders' derivative suit based on duty of loyalty grounds,
against the insiders.88 Furthermore, to the extent there is such sig-
naling, the secrecy of the trade secret may be impaired to the point
at which the corporation would lose its property interest in it, since a
condition to trade secrecy protection is the presence of reasonable
precautions to preserve the secrecy of the information.87 In Texas
81. See 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 40, § 6.02(2), at 6-26, 6-27 (1987).
82. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 70, at 748-68.
83. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 40, § 7.07(1), at 7-126 to 7-171 (1987). Plaintiff
must prove that (1) it is the owner of a trade secret; (2) defendant wrongfully took the
trade secret from plaintiff without plaintiffis authorization; (3) defendant's use of the
trade secret is wrongful; and (4) defendant has used or disclosed the trade secret to
plaintiff's detriment. Id. at 7-126 to 7-134.
84. See Carney, supra note 3. Professor Carney argues that absent leaks insider
trading in and of itself does not cause investors to buy or sell shares in impersonal mar-
kets. He points out that in stocks with large numbers of shares outstanding, even institu-
tions are able to transact large blocks without changing the price from the prior trade.
Id. at 887. See contra Givoly & Palmon, supra note 3, who argue that their data shows
that a large part of the stock market profits of insiders are due to the information dis-
closed through the trades. But Givoly and Palmon cannot explain why the greater signals
of larger trades do not result in larger abnormal returns.
85. See Carney, supra note 3, at 873-74.
86. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. See also Macey, supra note 3, at
45.
87. Under section 1(4)(ii) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the plaintiff seeking
relief must have made "reasonable efforts" to maintain secrecy. The Commissioners state
that "reasonable efforts" to preserve secrecy include "advising employees of the existence
of a Trade Secret, limiting access to a Trade Secret on a "need to know" basis, and
Gulf Sulphur, harm would be proved if evidence indicated that in-
sider trading tipped potential real estate sellers to the existence of a
valuable find in their land for which they should significantly raise
their selling price.
If the insider trading did not harm the corporation, or if the trad-
ing actually benefited the corporation, then arguably there was no
violation of trade secrets law. However, since the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act permits recovery for unjust enrichment caused by misap-
propriation (as well as recovery of loss), it would seem that harm to
the corporation is not essential where the defendant, without corpo-
rate consent, was enriched by use of the trade secret in stock trad-
ing. 8 At least one state court has held that in a case of insider trad-
ing without corporate consent, harm resulting from the insider's
breach of duty of loyalty need not be proved; only benefit to the
insider need be shown. 9
Voluntary Corporate Action
A number of legal commentators have argued forcefully that in-
sider trading, far from harming the corporation, actually benefits it
because the financial rewards from the trading act as an incentive to
insiders to innovate and discover trade secrets and other valuable in-
formation." Moreover, the trading arguably moves the prices of the
stock in the right direction, commensurate to its actual worth, with-
out forcing premature disclosure of the trade secret to the public and
controlling plant access. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § I comment, 14 U.L.A. 541, 543
(1985).
88. Id. § 3, 14 U.L.A. 541, 546 (1985). See also supra note 21.
89. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 496, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80,
248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1969) (possible harm to the firm's reputation for integrity; how-
ever, the court asserted that an allegation of damages "has never been considered to be
an essential requirement for a cause of action founded on a breach of fiduciary duty.").
In Diamond, two officers of the issuer sold stock on inside negative news. The case in-
volved a derivative suit to compel defendant to account for their profits. It was not a rule
lob-5 case. This argument has been turned down by two other courts that have faced the
issue. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d
739 (Fla. 1975). However, the Supreme Court seems to have looked on Diamond approv-
ingly. See Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987); see also supra note
21.
90. Managers have incentives to divert more of the income stream generated
by the firm's assets to themselves than they initially agreed upon .... Thus,
both managers and shareholders have incentives to reach agreements ex ante
that limit divergent behavior by managers .... [Incentive] contracts that pro-
vide for periodic renegotiation ex post based on (imperfectly) observed effect
and output are alternatives to contracts that ex ante tie the compensation to
output. Such renegotiations are ... costly.
Insider trading may present a solution to this cost-of-renegotiation dilemma.
The unique advantage of insider trading is that it allows a manager to alter his
compensation package in renegotiation . . . . This in turn increases the man-
ager's incentive to acquire and develop valuable information . . ..
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 869-71.
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competitors. 1 Additionally, it has been argued that the trading usu-
ally causes no harm to sellers on the other side.9 2 These arguments
bear directly on whether there should be a voluntary corporate deci-
sion to permit insider trading where the corporation owns that infor-
mation. That decision involves an evaluation of the wisdom and con-
sequences of allowing insiders to trade on inside secret information
as a form of compensation.
If the board and/or shareholders explicitly or implicitly consent to
the insider's use of the material information, then the Chiarella case
requirement of a violation of a fiduciary duty is eliminated, and with
it, the rule lOb-5 violation.93 Since Chiarella required breach of a
fiduciary duty, consent by the corporation to whom the duty is owed
ends the violation.9 4 Phrased in property terms, the Chiarella re-
quirement of a fiduciary duty stands for the conclusion that where
the corporation owns the confidential information, and has not li-
censed its use in insider trading by the management defendant, the
insider may not trade on it. Hence, granting the property right to the
insider ends the violation.9 5 Likewise, consent of the board and/or
shareholders (whichever is appropriate corporate action in the cir-
cumstances) will eliminate the possibility of a trade secret violation.
As mentioned above, there are certain circumstances in which a
trade secret is held by the courts to be property of the employee, not
of the employer. 6 In such a case it would be impossible for the cor-
poration or any plaintiff to argue successfully that the employee vio-
lated her fiduciary duty in trading on information since it belonged
to her and not the corporate employer. Hence, the fiduciary duties of
rule lOb-5 established in Chiarella9 7 would not be applicable in that
91. Sometimes corporations have good business reasons to keep information se-
cret. The Texas Gulf Sulphur case is such an example. See supra notes 6, 10 & 80, and
accompanying text. However, if insiders trade, the share prices will move closer to where
they would have been if there had been full disclosure. How much the price moves will
depend upon how much "noise" masks the insider trades from outsiders. See Plott &
Sunder, Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Ap-
plication of Rational-Expectations Models, 90 J. POL ECON. 663 (1982) (utilization of
simulation model to demonstrate that markets adjust rapidly to insider information).
92. See generally H. MANNE, supra note 3; Carney, supra note 3.
93. For a different treatment under rule 14e-3, see infra notes 140-55 and accom-
panying text.
94. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 3; and Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment
Analysis: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 136 (1984).
95. For discussion of rule 14e-3, see infra notes 140-155 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 24.
case.
The corporate consent to insider trading in Case I, where the cor-
poration initially owns the information, would involve the judgment
that insider trading constitutes a form of efficient management com-
pensation. 8 The trade secret or other valuable information is corpo-
rate property which the corporation may grant to the insider to util-
ize in trading. But there is an accepted model for the authorization
of the payment. It is usually in the form of board of directors' action
authorizing specific payments to senior management. 99
Assume that the board of directors of a publicly held corporation
adopted such a resolution. Immediately such a resolution would re-
solve the use of corporate information qua property problem.
Clearly, within the usual limits of duties of loyalty and care, the
corporation can dispense corporate property as a form of manage-
ment compensation. Under traditional corporate law, if the compen-
sation is established by a committee composed exclusively of inde-
pendent, nonmanagement directors, the business judgment rule
would be applicable.100
Business Judgment Doctrine
The test of business judgment rule turns on whether the board, in
good faith and after adequate investigation of the facts, believes that
the form of compensation improves rather than perversely distorts
management's incentives to maximize corporate profits. 101 The board
need not be correct in its judgment.
Theoretical arguments of considerable plausibility on both sides of
the debate have been exhaustively set forth in the literature. 0 2 The
author is not aware of any conclusive empirical proof one way or the
other. Clearly now, when insider trading is a violation of law, it
would be difficult to find empirical proof of the efficacy of insider
trading as a form of management compensation. However, given the
theoretical plausibility of insider trading as an efficient mode of corn-
pensation, it appears that a board's decision to implement such a
regime would be able to pass muster under the permissive business
judgment rule test.1
0 3
98. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., H. HENN, TEACHING MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 530-31 (2d ed.
1986).
100. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.03 & Commentary (Tentative Draft No. 5)
(1986).
101. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
102. For example, contrast the arguments against using insider trading to compen-
sate management in Cox, supra note 3, at 649-55, with the arguments in favor in Carl-
ton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 869-72, 876-78.
103. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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The board decision would turn on a deliberate balancing between
the corporate need to protect and insulate inside information and the
potential benefits to be gained in allowing an insider's use of it for
compensation. The latter premise recognizes that insider trading
does not constitute a dangerous form of signaling the existence of
trade secrets to competitors.104 Additionally, the board would evalu-
ate the various arguments that have been presented in the seminal
work of Dean Henry Manne and the scholars who have debated his
positions pro and con through the years.'0 5 For example, the board
would weigh the danger that inside information would be used by
managers who did not create the information against the incentives
for innovation by creative managers. 106 The board would also con-
sider the possibility that such a scheme would permit managers to
sell on bad news as well as buy on good news. 07 Other downside
factors the board would consider include the possibility that manag-
ers would delay disclosure of information in order to benefit from the
secrecy, 10 8 and the difficulties of policing insider trading and ob-
taining accurate reports from managers on the extent of their
trades. 09 Finally, the board would consider the arguments that in-
sider trading is a more sensitive tool for awarding management com-
pensation than after the fact contract renegotiations or salary adjust-
104. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 3.
106. Professor Anthony Kronman has suggested that regulation of insider trading
may be rationalized by "the idea that inside information is more likely to be casually
discovered rather than deliberately produced." Kronman, supra note 80, at 34.
However, worthwhile information must be created before it can be accidentally ac-
quired. A ban on insider trading might chill the production of valuable information.
107. See, e.g., Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trad-
ing and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1440-42 (1967).
The danger is that, therefore, managers will be indifferent about being efficient or
incompetent. However, managers work in teams and, therefore, must convince each other
to do bad things. Each manager will be interested in her long run reputation; hence,
managers will not be keen on working with others to decrease the value of the firm.
108. See, e.g., Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 470, 489 (1969). Compare Dooley, supra note 3, at 34, who found after
investigation of cases that insider trading did not postpone the public disclosure of infor-
mation. Also, insider trading may sometimes speed up disclosure because the potentiality
of gain is based upon the information being disclosed. An additional danger lies in the
fact that investors in the stock market, by selling short, can capture profits on any pre-
dictable swing in the price of stocks. Therefore, an investor who knows that the market
price of a stock will decline can reap the same type of profit from trading on that infor-
mation as might be had from trading on a stock rising in value. The potential exists for
management to create drops in the stock price just so that insiders can trade on that
information.
109. See supra note 73.
ments at the end of each year.110 The important point is that the
argument would be debated in the context of the relatively liberal
and permissive business judgment rule,"1 ' not the rigid criminal stat-
utes such as section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act.112 Under tradi-
tional corporate law, the business judgment test would apply pro-
vided the insider trading mode of compensation was set by an
independent committee of nonmanagement directors.2
3
In every rule 1Ob-5 case of insider trading (Case I) the premise is
that the corporate employer previously had decided not to release the
information immediately. Presumably a good business reason for the
secrecy exists." 4 If the corporate employer, in its business judgment,
felt that immediate disclosure was advisable, it would so disclose and
the price of the stock would move rapidly to its correct equilibrium
level. Hence, the corporate employer, when authorizing insider trad-
ing, must have decided that signaling will not compromise the
secrecy.
Misappropriation Doctrine
The second major scenario in so-called insider trading under rule
lOb-5 involves the misappropriation doctrine, or Case II.11 In that
form rule 1Ob-5 is applied to the use by a corporate outsider of se-
cret information filched from his employer or another. The informa-
tion bears on the stock price of another corporation.
The Case II misappropriation cases frequently involve situations in
which a third party bribes the employee to steal employer-owned in-
formation about another corporation." 6 The cases resemble commer-
110. See supra note 90.
111. There is enormous literature on the duty of care and the business judgment
rule. See, e.g., 39 Bus. LAW. 1461-1559 (1984), 40 Bus. LAW 1373-1455 (1985) (in-
cludes reference to much of the older literature). See also Veasey & Manning, Codified
Standard - Safe Harbor or Uncharted Ree.?, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980); Arsht & Hin-
sey, Codified Standard - Same Harbor But Charted Channel. A Response, 35 Bus.
LAW. 947 (1980).
112. See supra note 24.
113. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
114. In many cases, for example, important information should be hidden from
competitors. Insider trading may thus permit firms to indirectly communicate informa-
tion with a lesser risk of compromising its competitive position. See supra note 91.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983). Other cases have involved assumptions of confidentiality between
corporations and their lawyers, SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
and between a father and his son, United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also supra note 21.
116. Boesky Apparently Reaped at Least $203 Million in Illicit Profits with Le-
vine's Inside Information, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 2, col. 2; see also N.Y.C. BAR
REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-7:
The present statutory basis for both civil and criminal insider trading liabil-
ity, the Securities and [sic] Exchange Act of 1934, does not directly address
trading on non-public information - and proscription of such trading is depen-
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cial bribery and trade secret cases in which third parties work in
conspiracy with an employee to steal and use trade secrets of the
employer." 7 Indeed, they are indistinguishable from trade secret and
commercial bribery cases. Certainly if a case brought on a trading
misappropriation theory involves harm to the employer, a traditional
trade secret violation may be involved."" For example, if the em-
ployee of an investment banker, in return for payment by a third
party, steals material information in the possession of the employer
regarding a stock trading transaction, which harms the employer or
its client, a traditional trade secret or commercial bribery cause of
action necessarily exists.
If, on the other hand, the employer explicitly or implicitly grants
permission to the employee to use the information in connection with
a stock trade, under rule 1Ob-5 and the Chiarella doctrine, there is
no securities violation. The employer's permission obviates any mis-
appropriation. There is no trade secret violation since employers may
license third parties to use trade secrets so long as the licensee main-
tains the confidentiality of the trade secret." 9 (The rule 14e-3 case is
addressed below). However, since the Case II trade, with or without
employer permission, involves the potential to harm the public
trader, it is clear that the misappropriation doctrine is not related to
harm to public traders. 20
dent on SEC rulemaking under the Act's general anti-fraud provisions and ju-
dicial application of those anti-fraud rules and rules on insider trading. While
this may be an acceptable manner in which to impose civil liability for insider
trading - although even that is open to question - we believe it is a wholly
inappropriate basis for imposing criminal liability ....
The legislative history of the Securities and [sic] Exchange Act of 1934 sug-
gests that Congress intended to eliminate trading on inside information by cor-
porate insiders . . . . The statute, however, contains only one provision - §
16 - specifically aimed at insider trading, and it prohibits only short-swing
transactions by a limited class of insiders (See 15 U.S.C. § 78p. 1982) . . .
[R]ecovery under § 16 does not depend on proof of actual abuse of inside
information.
The limited scope of § 16 as a weapon against insider trading raises ques-
tions about what Congress in 1934 actually intended to do about trading on
insider information. The SEC, however, has long abhorred the practice of in-
sider trading, and it found a different section of the Exchange Act - §
10(b) . ...
Under the authority granted by 10(b), the SEC created Rule lOb-5 in 1942.
117. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
119. 2 R. MILGRIM, supra note 40, § 9.03(2), at 9-70 (1986).
120. There is considerable evidence that insider trading does not cause harm to
public traders, but we assume here for the sake of argument that it does. See generally
Carney, supra note 84.
Contracts to Protect Trade Secrets
The literature on trade secrets law makes it clear that because of
uncertainty. about who owns the information, there is widespread (al-
though not unanimous) use of express contracts to protect trade
secrets.121 For example, one survey showed that of eighty-six compa-
nies surveyed, eighty-three used some form of express agreement. 122
Many of these agreements protect so called "confidential informa-
tion." For example, one form of agreement suggested in the leading
treatise on trade secret law stated, inter alia: "Except as required in
my duties to Company, I will never, directly, indirectly, or otherwise
use, disseminate, disclose, lecture upon or publish articles concerning
any CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.1' 12 3 The term is defined
in the contract to mean:
[I]nformation disclosed to me or known by me as a consequence of or
through my employment by Company (including information conceived,
originated, discovered or developed by me), . . . not generally known in the
relevant trade of [sic] industry, about Company's products, processes and
services, including information relating to research, development, INVEN-
TIONS, manufacture, purchasing, and engineering.
12
4
Obviously this is a very broad definition that closely parallels the
securities law concept of materiality.
A fair reading of trade secrets law and the language of these con-
tracts is that corporations do not consent to the use of inside infor-
mation in stock trading where there is some significant risk of signal-
ing the secret to the public or the competition. Of course, since
Professor Carney, as discussed earlier, 125 has demonstrated the un-
likely frequency of such a risk, the contractual prohibitions may not
apply to insider trading unless they are interpreted (as they might
be) as forbidding employee benefit from the use of the information
even where such use does not monetarily harm the corporate
employer. 1
26
Differences from Trade Secrets
There is an important respect in which trade secrets law and in-
sider trading differ. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that
shareholders or boards of directors, or employers in the misappropri-
ation scenario, consent to the use of an insider trading compensation
scheme, there is still the question of the impact on public stock trad-
121. 1 R. MILRIM, supra note 40, § 3.02, at 3.9.
122. Id.
123. 3 R. MILGRIM, supra note 40, app. C, at C-11.
124. Id. app. C, at C-8.
125. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text; see also supra note 21.
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ers. 2 7 Consider the facts of insider trading Case I involving a corpo-
rate director or officer. 28 Assume the board of directors explicitly or
implicitly has approved use of inside information in stock trading as
a form of presumably efficient management compensation. Assume
the decision was made by a compensation committee of outside or
independent directors. 29 The argument may still be made that de-
spite the board's decision, the trading harms the public traders in the
market place and/or is unfair to them. 30 The issue has always been
the difficulty of finding causation. Public traders buy or sell for rea-
sons unrelated to the insider's trades. Since they are not dealing face
to face, but in the open marketplace where no privity of contract
exists between them, there is great difficulty in finding that the in-
sider caused any harm to (that is, prompted the trades of) the public
traders. 13 ' Some have argued that causation exists because disclosure
would have compelled the public to act differently. But that argu-
ment assumes the very question at issue, namely, whether a duty to
disclose exists. 32
127. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 3, at 343-46.
128. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
129. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 100, § 503 & comments; Wolfson, The Theoretical and Empirical Failings of
the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, in THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1987).
130. This question was first analyzed at length in a coherent fashion by Henry
Manne. See H. MANNE, supra note 3, at 107-09.
131. The task is to prove that the entry of trades by insiders actually induced
outsiders to buy or sell. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 309 F. Supp. 548 (D.
Utah 1970), affd as modified, 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971) (court implicitly held that since trading by insiders did not induce trades by out-
siders, no causation was shown).
132. See Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547,
551-53 (1970).
The Sixth Circuit stated that:
The flaw in this logic we conclude, is that it assumes the very injury which it
then declares compensable. It does so by presupposing that the duty to disclose
is absolute, and the plaintiff is injured when the information is denied him. The
duty to disclose, however, is not an absolute one, but an alternative one, that of
either disclosing or abstaining from trading. We conceive it to be the act of
trading which essentially constitutes the violation of Rule lOb-5, for it is this
which brings the illicit benefit to the insider, and it is this conduct which im-
pairs the integrity of the market and which is the target of the rule. If the
insider does not trade, he has an absolute right to keep material information
secret. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra at 848. Investors must be pre-
pared to accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or
always accurate information. Defendant's trading did not alter plaintiffs' ex-
pectations when they sold their stock, and in no way influenced plaintiffs' trad-
ing decision.
Friedrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318, (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053
Critics of insider trading have attempted to prove the likelihood
that by moving the price of the stock, insider trading causes public
traders to sell or buy; hence, the critics find causation. For example,
they argue that the insider trade causes the price to rise which leads
some public traders to sell earlier than they otherwise would. 3
Thus, public traders lose the profit they would have captured if they
had held and sold after the inside news was disclosed. These argu-
ments appear to be irrelevant, however, once we assume that a board
or a board and shareholder body, through accepted corporate proce-
dure, has approved insider trading and confidential information. It
appears extremely difficult for public shareholders to cry legal "foul"
as a result of such approved trading. They have approved (or bar-
gained for) the transfer of rights in the information they once collec-
tively owned through their corporate vehicle, to the insiders. In re-
turn for the transfer, they require the insiders to take less in direct
compensation.3 Critics of the practice must then prove that insider
trading is so pernicious to society and all parties involved that boards
or shareholders should not be permitted to make these informed vol-
untary decisions.135
The same holds true for the misappropriation violations of Case
II, but with certain differences. Assume that the employer and client
in Chiarella explicitly permitted Chiarella to trade on the secret in-
formation, which was the client's intent to buy up target corporation
stock. Perhaps the employer and client had decided that Chiarella's
trades would facilitate the client's bidding strategy by placing target
stock in friendly hands. 136 The target shareholders have no property
right in the information that arose out of the client's or tender of-
feror's takeover plan. Further, the tender offeror's consent satisfies
the assumption of Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella that a
wrongful taking or misappropriation is required.'
A requirement for Chiarella and the bidders to disclose the infor-
mation before trading would chill tender offerors' incentives to re-
search target companies and create the information that the tender
offerors hold in confidence. This argument is in accord with trade
secret law, which allows businesses to create, keep secret, and license
confidential information to inspire innovation and research. At the
opposite end of the spectrum is a "market egalitarian" approach that
would require virtually all property rights in information to be
(1977).
133. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
134. See Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1449 (1986).
135. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
136. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234; see infra notes 140-54 and accompanying
text.
137. See supra notes 23-24, 118-19 and accompanying text.
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shared equally with everyone no matter how lawful the information's
original acquisition. 138
The target shareholders could argue that unlike Case I, they have
not consented to, nor bargained for, the transaction with the party
who has the inside information. The answer then will turn on the
"market egalitarian" duty, if any, to disclose in the absence of any
traditional fiduciary relationship between the bidders, their tippees,
and the target shareholders. The general response to this proposition
in American law has been negative, since to impose such a duty
would chill the incentives to discover, create, or innovate new ideas
or information.139
Rule 14e-3
Rule 14e-3140 abandons the theft of information approach of
court-construed rule lOb-5. The rule provides that any tippee who
receives information about an impending or actual tender offer from
the bidder or target companies or their officers, and trades on that
information is subject to civil or criminal prosecution.' 4 ' This holds
true even where the tender offeror or target voluntarily informs the
tippee in hope (but without agreement) that he or she will trade on
that information.142 The rule was promulgated after the Chiarella
holding and in effect reverses it insofar as tipping with respect to
tender offers is concerned. The SEC justified the rule on the basis of
preventing unfair disparities in information. 43 Hence, with respect
to information regarding tender offers, the SEC has adopted the
"market egalitarian" view mentioned above. Therefore, where a hos-
tile tender offeror believes that it can best succeed by tipping an
arbitrageur, it is forbidden from doing so.' 44 Practically speaking, a
138. The SEC never has adopted this extreme view in rule lOb-5 cases. See, e.g.,
Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
139. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
140. 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1986). See Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, 1980
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980) [hereinafter Rule 14e-3 Release].
The SEC stated that "the Commission ... continues to have serious concerns about
trading by persons in possession of material, nonpublic information relating to a tender
offer. This practice results in unfair disparities in market information and market dis-
ruption." Rule 14e-3 Release at 83,457 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
141. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1986).
142. "If an offering person tells another persons that the offering person will make
a tender offer which information is nonpublic, the other person has acquired material,
nonpublic information directly from the offering person and has a duty under Rule 14e-
3(a)." Rule 14e-3 Release at 83,459.
143. See supra note 140.
144. See Jensen, Don't Freeze The Arbs Out, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1986, at 26, col.
tender offeror might prefer multiple smaller purchases, by arbi-
trageurs and other bidders, due to the less significant impact upon
the price of the stock than buying in volume alone. 4" The rule pro-
hibits this even though the tender offeror has, in effect, licensed the
trade secret or other valuable information for use by the arbitrageur.
Of course, other statutory provisions apply; after a purchaser obtains
five percent of the shares of the target corporation, section 13(d)
requires public disclosure within ten days of the purchases. 46 The
13(d) "window" permits the purchaser to exceed the five percent fig-
ure during the ten day waiting period. Also, if a person's purchases
actually constitute a tender offer, it must immediately be disclosed
through a public filing with the SEC.147 Absent the last two condi-
tions, a corporation currently may buy up to five percent of the tar-
get stock and more during the "window" secretly. Also, a group con-
cept applies so that different individuals who buy in concert may
together count toward the five percent threshold which triggers the
public filing requirement.148
The SEC has reasoned that the rule protects shareholders of the
target corporation from disparities in information. 49 Put somewhat
differently, the practical effect of the rule operates to award target
shareholders with a property interest in the information developed by
the prospective tender offeror, that is, its own plan to ultimately
tender an offer. This property award by operation of regulation de-
prives the tender offeror of the ability to sell or transfer its interest
in the information to others who may trade on it.
If courts, the SEC, or Congress should, in interpreting rule 1Ob-5,
prevent corporations by board or shareholder action from transfer-
ring rights in inside information to managers, the result would be
similar in concept to the result reached by rule 14e-3. In a Case I
transaction such consent flows from the affected (or trading) share-
holders through the modality of board and shareholder decision.
Therefore, judicial or congressional action would mean that such a
voluntary informed decision must not be permitted due to the terri-
ble consequences. Since rule 14e-3 forbids voluntary tipping in cer-
tain cases by issuers, that rule reaches such a conclusion in the areas
regulated by it.'50
4. Arbitrageurs are professional dealers who buy stock of impending or actual target
companies in the hope that they will make a profit when and if the takeover bid succeeds
and they sell out to the successful bidder.
145. See Carney, supra note 3, at 892-93.
146. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(3), as
amended by Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90439, 82 Stat. 455.
147. Id. § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d).
148. Id. § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3).
149. See supra note 140.
150. See supra note 13.
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In the 14e-3 transaction, the bidder lawfully, not by illegal misap-
propriation, develops information - its intent to bid and the signal
that bid conveys about future possibilities of its management if it
succeeds - yet the rule assigns to others, the shareholders of the
target, rights to that information. This is merely another way of
describing a market egalitarian approach to information: that rights
to information must be shared equally by all who may be affected by
the information. The 14e-3 approach may, in the end, harm bidders
and target shareholders. The rule prevents bidders from tipping risk
arbitrageurs and hence facilitating the success of their bids. Thus,
the rule may chill the incentive of bidders to make tender offers by
increasing, ex ante, the cost of bidding.151 Second, the chilling effect
may hurt target shareholders by decreasing the disciplinary threat of
tender offers on incumbent management. 152 Incumbent management
may be freer to be lazy or inefficient.15 3 Also, the chilling effect may
decrease the number of mergers which produce synergistic cost sav-
ings or efficiency resulting from the marriage of different busi-
nesses. 15 On the other hand, sections 14(d), 13(d), the group con-
cept and the proposed new market sweep rules 55 may create much
of the same chill effect even without rule 14e-3. It is difficult to mea-
sure without careful empirical testing the extent of the incremental
impact of rule 14e-3. In sum, rule 14e-3 may be the cause of more
harm than good. While insuring that all investors have equal access
to information may appear to some to be a worthwhile goal, this rule
clearly goes too far.
CONCLUSION
This Article has endeavored to advance the concept of insider
trading law under rule 1Ob-5 as an effort to protect property rights
in important information. It has attempted to do that by exploring
the relationships between concepts of trade secrets law and insider
trading doctrine. Indeed, rule 10b-5 securities law on insider trading
may be viewed as a form of trade secrets law. The Article also has
shown how traditional business judgment doctrine can support corpo-
151. See Jensen, supra note 144, at 26, col. 4.
152. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169-74 (1981). The contrasting
arguments on this issue are developed in R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPO-
RATE ACQUISITIONS (1986).
153. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 152, at 1175.
154. Id.
155. See Exchange Act Release No. 24,976, 52 Fed. Reg. 37,473 (Oct. 7, 1987).
rate decisions to use inside information as a form of executive
compensation.
